Is it true that killing is bad? Or is there a fact of the matter? Many of us like to think so, yet we can't really describe what this fact consists in. Somehow, a state of affairs, a collection of stuff, is normative. A main motivation being a moral realism is the accompanying power of explanation. Why do I think Hitler is bad? Because he really was a horrible person.
I recently came across a fascinating article by Gilbert Harmen, who points out an asymmetry between scientific and moral explanation. Harmen asks us to consider a scientists who is conducting an experiment. She is working with a theory that predicts that she will see some phenomenon X in her cloud chamber. Now, if she looks in her cloud chamber and does see what the theory predicted, then her theory being true would explain why she saw what she saw.
Harmen then asks us to consider seeing a group of boys doing a horrible thing: burning a cat for fun. He says that most people would have something like a `moral observation' where we just see this as bad. Now, let's say we have a theory, a moral theory, under which it is a fact that burning cats is bad. But it being true that burning cats is bad doesn't really seem to explain why we would have the `moral observation' we have. The reason why we think this is bad, the explanation of why we think cat burning is bad, has to do with the way we were raised, facts about our psychology and how we were brought up. So, Harmen alleges, even if there were moral facts, it is not clear that they would take part in explanation, they way we think scientific facts do.
I don't know what to think of this. My first reaction is that it can't be that big a blow against realism. One possible way around is the Platonist route. There can be moral facts, but they are not knowable empirically but rather through some kind of rational moral intuition (like a Kantian picture with reflection on maxims or something). Or moral truths are self-evident. The other way to go is to simply deny Harmen's claim that moral truths can't explain why we have certain moral observations. Why can't they? Harmen seems to just help himself to the fact that the explanation of why we feel the ways we do must come only from psychology. But why can't moral facts supervene on physical states in a way our psychology is sensitive to?
Thursday, November 15, 2007
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8 comments:
Hi John,
This is a very interesting post! Sorry about such a delay in my response!
My own immediate thought is that I can easily think of a moral theory to account for why burning cats is bad, and that this theory seems to me to work perfectly well to explain: the theory would be that cats can feel pain, and burning is terribly painful, and it is wrong to intentionally cause pain, and so burning cats is bad.
I do not immediately see why this would fail as an explanation, or what the asymmetry is in comparison to scientific explanation.
Maybe I am not fully understanding the point Harmen is trying to make?
--Laura
Hey Dr. Rediehs!
I think your theory would be *an* explanation of why we think cat burning is bad. But here is what I think Harmen is up to.
If a scientist sees phenomenon X, and her theory predicted that she would see X, then her theory being true would explain why she sees X when she does. So, if her theory is true, the scientific fact her theory describes causes her to see X and thus the reason why she sees X is because her theory is true. I think what Harmen is pushing here is something like an exclusion principle about explanations: if there is a sufficient cause of X, then nothing else can be the cause of X or explain why X is the case.
Now, when we see a cat being burned for fun, we have an immediate moral observation X = "that's horrible!" Harmen is going to want to say that the cause of you having this observation, the reason why you feel this way, are facts about your psychology. His move then is this: if these scientific facts are the sufficient cause, then any separate moral facts are not relevant in explaining why you feel the way you do, since your psychology would be a sufficient cause. And if there is a sufficient cause of X, then that cause is the reason why X happened.
So, I don't think Harmen can claim that moral theories can't account for certain things being bad. If a moral theory like the one you stated logically entails that burning cats is bad, then that theory being true would be sufficient for it being true that burning cats is bad.
But I think he's trying to merely secure the claim that such a moral theory would provide irrelevant explanations for why WE have the `moral observations' we do, if the causes of our reactions to bad things can be explained via psychology.
I think the weak spot in his argument is that if there is a sufficient cause of X, then nothing else can be the cause of X.
--John
Howdy! I love this discussion. It brings back so many memories. This is Wes Fleming '79, Phil & Eng major. So how does one derive, create, or discover a body of moral knowledge? Can reason derive moral belief by itself? To imply it is derived seems to suggest it already exists. I’m still looking for a way to “develop” moral theory apart from “rational moral intuition,” 'inner observations', "ideas of reflection," 'psychological experience' and a “law written in our hearts.” Are moral truths simply self-evident? Are they preexistent and await revelation?
Hi John,
Thanks for your response. I still find this odd. It seems that Harmen is forcing the question by insisting that a psychological explanation is sufficient and therefore precludes a moral theory/explanation.
That would be like trying to explain scientific observations with respect to theories about the physiology of sense perception, and then claiming that that is sufficient and therefore scientific theories/explanations are not needed.
You have me intrigued. I will look up Harmen's article and read it myself. Do you have the full reference?
Thanks,
Laura
Dear Wes Fleming,
Thank you so much for writing! I am always delighted when alumni find our blog and chime in!
The questions you raise fascinate me too. I am teaching Ethical Theory this semester and finding it wonderful to revisit other philosophers' answers to these questions. We are about to read Kant, who did think reason can derive moral belief by itself. As I re-read Kant and consider his perspective again, I'll probably have more to say about this and will write about it here.
Meanwhile, I too keep thinking and wondering about whether moral truths are in some sense preexistent and, if so, what this really means.
Do they express some basic truths about human nature and human relations? If so, I think that these truths are not limited just to biological truths but also include basic truths about the nature of human consciousness. Since rationality is key to human consciousness, then this may have been what Kant was pursuing too.
So, I'll keep thinking about this and will post more thoughts soon.
I looked at was an excerpt from his "intro" ethics book. The book is called "The Nature of Morality: an Introduction to Ethics." Unfortunately, I'm not sure where this example is in the book.
You are certainly right - just because one identifies a sufficient cause for X does not mean one has found the only explanation for X. I'm sure he's got to have a fuller story to tell. His example is interesting, I'm just not sure what he needs to make it work, other than something like the faulty exclusion principle that I suggested was at work.
Thanks, John. I'll look for this. And I appreciate your analysis of the faulty exclusion principle.
Notice that his argument, if indeed my construction of his argument is not a straw man, can be reapplied against any sort variety of mathematical platonism: since the sufficient cause of you believing that 1+1=2 is that you got a gold star on your practice set in 1st grade (or whatever), the non-causal mathematical fact cannot explain why you believe it, since mathematical facts are abstract concepts are not physical things, and only physical things participate in cause and effect relationships.
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